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TREES And PUBLIC LIABILITY – WHO REALLY  
dECIdES WHAT IS REASOnABLY SAFE?
Luke Bennett1
Abstract
This article has its origins in investigations that the author has been 
undertaking into the effects of public safety and liability perception 
in the built and natural environment (e.g. bennett and crowe, 2008; 
bennett, 2009 and bennett and gibbeson, 2010). In these previous 
studies the author and colleagues have examined the impact of public 
safety and liability concerns upon memorial management in cemeteries, 
access to the countryside and to the training of built environment 
professionals. In these studies the aim has been to explore how the 
liability perceptions of owners and managers of such places is formed, 
and specifically whether public safety and liability perceptions have 
a tendency to cluster around certain patterns and conventions within 
particular ‘interpretive communities’ (fish, 1980). Underlying these 
studies is a hypothesis that lay communities are at least as important 
as lawyers and courts in setting what the law regarding liability for 
site safety actually is in practice. In this paper the aim is to directly 
engage with an interpretive community that is engaged in a phase of 
public safety and liability anxiety, in this case current debate about 
the merits (or otherwise) of setting explicit standards for the safety 
inspection of trees. 
Introduction
The author is an academic, currently teaching property, environmental and 
safety law to environmental, real estate and housing students, but with a 
previous career working as a solicitor in legal practice as an environmental 
and public safety specialist. This article has its origins in a paper on 
street trees and liability risk perception given at a conference at Sheffield 
Hallam University in February 2010. However, in developing the paper 
for publication in this journal, the opportunity has been taken to focus 
specifically on engaging with arboriculturalists through your professional 
1Senior Lecturer (Law), Department of the Built Environment, Sheffield Hallam University: 
l.e.bennett@shu.ac.uk
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journal (one of the key forums of your interpretive community). The author 
does so with some trepidation – as it would be easier to write a paper on 
trends in tree safety and liability risk perception for an academic, socio-
legal audience who have no day to day, expert and practical engagement 
with the dilemmas and physical reality of managing trees. However, 
by engaging with those that the author is (with every respect intended) 
observing and studying it gives those with views and/or vested interests an 
opportunity to comment (whether formally through this journal) or privately 
in correspondence with the author and thereby influence his ongoing 
analysis of safety and liability debates in a variety of place management 
situations. It is hoped that through this approach the author’s understanding 
of how this particular interpretive community has evolved its patterns and 
conventions of liability perception will be all the clearer.
But this article is not merely a glorified research questionnaire – it 
offers up a substantive analysis of recent trends in the tree safety debate by 
reference to wider themes and context. For it is the opportunity to see what 
is happening in other fields of place management, and generic processes at 
work in the courts, that may be the key contribution that this article can 
offer to current debates within tree management.
This article will look at the issue of public liability for tree safety from 
two angles:
A) What liability does the law impose for trees and public safety?; and
B) How do landowner perceptions of such liability affect what the law 
actually requires?
The first angle requires a fairly traditional legal analysis. By looking at 
recent cases trends we can see how the law is interpreted by the courts. 
However, the second angle is more complicated – and may meet with 
hostility. You may say “But surely the law is what the courts say it is? – it 
doesn’t matter what people perceive it to be”. But this article will argue 
that is does matter – greatly, in fact.
Trees as problem
This article will not outline the benefits of trees. Clearly there are many 
of these: aesthetic, ecological and economic and this author agrees with 
commentators like ball (2007a) and watt (2007) that greater attention 
needs to be paid to the risk-benefit of having trees. The article’s focus 
will necessarily be upon trees as (perceived) problems: trees as object 
of (liability) fear. By such a (pessimistic) reading trees can equate to 
obstruction, potential collision hazard, disease bearer, pest shelter, child 
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allurer, built structure deformer2, and/or imposing structures in their own 
right, as eden ominously puts it:
“the earth’s largest living organisms: objects often larger than 
houses, often heavier than cars, almost always taller than humans…” 
(2007:127). 
Thus, looked at pessimistically, trees can be seen as ‘an accident waiting to 
happen’ – often accompanied by a related perception that such an ‘accident’ 
would bring with it consequent exposure to liability (criminal or civil) for 
the unlucky owner of that wayward tree.
In broad terms (let’s skip the detail3) through a combination of the 
common law (the torts of nuisance and negligence) and statute (the Occupiers’ 
Liability Acts of 1957 and 1984) persons with control over property have a 
duty to manage that property reasonably and thereby achieve a reasonable 
level of safety related to things on that property. If an accident or injury 
arises (e.g. from a diseased tree falling over) then the question becomes, in 
liability terms, was that owner careful enough in how they managed that 
thing on their land4? An equivalent duty also exists under the criminal law, 
here the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 requires ‘reasonable safety’ to 
be achieved by persons controlling property as part of their business. This 
duty to provide for safety applies not just to safeguarding employees, but 
also providing safety for visitors and passers-by.
How much care is needed? What is reasonable?
Here we get to standard lawyerly caveat: “well, it depends on the 
circumstances”. Factors such as the following will need to be investigated 
(ultimately by a court) on a ‘case-by-case basis’ in order to determine 
whether what was done was reasonable (and sufficient)5:
2Under a variety of statutes public agencies have powers to address dangerous or meddlesome 
trees: e.g. Highways Act 1980, Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, 
Railway Improvements Act 1871, Telecommunciations Act 1984, Electricity Act 1989 and the 
Civil Aviation Act 1982.
3For the detail the reader is referred to the exposition of public liability principles and case 
law regarding tree safety in mynors (2002), stead (2008) and forbes-laird (2009) 
4Ownership of (and therefore responsibility for) street trees has historically been a complex 
issue. However, since Hurst –v– Hampshire County Council (1997) 2 EGLR 164 it appears 
that these legal complexities are likely to be ignored in most cases – and the Highways 
Authority assumed to have responsibility for street trees.
5Suggestions that a greater level of care was required for street trees because of their location 
was rejected by the House of Lords in Caminer –v– Northern and London Investment Trust 
(1951) AC 88. Instead it is the condition of the tree, rather than its location per se, that 
indicates how much care is required.
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• How likely was it that the tree would fall? – for example was it old 
and diseased or exposed to high winds and vibration?
• What scale of harm would be likely to manifest if the tree did fall? 
– is it right next to a road? Is the road busy? Is it on a bend (poor 
visibility)? Is it close to a school? (And thus likely that there would be 
a higher than average proportion of young children potentially exposed 
to the risk of injury).
• What practicable steps could be taken to safeguard the tree? – is 
there actually any workable (and cost effective) way of making the tree 
safe? Could remedial works make matters worse? Would a competent 
periodic survey of the tree’s condition have spotted the defect? 
The senior courts6 have been consistently reluctant to impose liability for 
natural hazards (a category into which trees are often bracketed) – fearing 
the resource implications, both for public and private sector pockets of 
doing so7. Take, for example, the House of Lords’ ruling in Stovin –v– 
Wise (1996) AC 323 that courts should not lightly intervene in judging the 
wisdom of local authorities’ decisions about management of the highway 
fringe, as to do so would see the courts:
(i) encouraging litigation against the public purse; and
(ii) interfering in finite resource allocation by the councils. 
In stovin the House of Lords refused to allow a claim against a Highway 
Authority by an injured motorist which was based on an allegation that 
that council had been negligent in having not used its powers under the 
Highways Act 1980 to improve visibility at a road junction by removing 
an embankment that was obscuring lines of sight. In that case the House of 
Lords echoed a line of argument also seen in a number of senior judicial 
decisions in recent years – namely that, the world cannot be made 100% 
safe and that people must accept the consequences of their actions (e.g. 
if they choose to drive on the roads) and that the courts should seek to 
discourage the (perceived) growth of a “compensation culture”8. This can 
also be seen in Tomlinson –v– Congleton Borough Council (2004) 1 AC 46 
where the House of Lords refused to impose liability upon a council for 
6For our purposes, the ‘superior courts’ are The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords (the 
latter now replaced – since October 2009 – by the Supreme Court). These are the courts, 
comprised of senior judiciary, to whom cases can be appealed. It is the superior courts that set 
the precedent (i.e. generic and future decision guiding) character of reported case law.
7See Leakey –v– National Trust (1980) QB 485; Holbeck Hall Hotel –v– Scarborough Borough 
Council (2000) BLR 109.
8See also s1 of the Compensation Act 2006 which has the same objective.
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failing to ensure that a young man could not render himself paralysed by 
diving into a shallow pond. In that case, Lord Scott presented this ‘personal 
responsibility’ theme in strident tones:
“Of course there is some risk of accidents arising out of the joie-de-
vivre of the young. But that is no reason for imposing a grey and dull 
safety regime on everyone.”(Para 94)
Clearly, risk-taking by reckless adventurers is one extreme, but in stovin 
the court was applying this principle to something more mundane: road 
use. We can also see this principle in a case involving a pedestrian who 
was blinded in one eye when he tripped on a tree root whilst walking along 
a nature reserve path. Here, the court declared that such paths (and tree 
roots) cannot be rendered 100% safe – and users must take responsibility 
for their own safe passage9.
However, the problem is that it is always possible to find cases that appear 
to point in the opposite direction. For example, a 2007 case10 in which 
an injured passer-by successfully claimed compensation after slipping on 
a single flower petal adjacent to a florists shop at Marylebone station. The 
claim was successful - on the basis that the presence of the petal proved 
that the shop did not have an adequate system in operation to ensure that 
no one could come to harm as a consequence of its operations. Permission 
to appeal against this ruling was refused by the Court of Appeal, leaving 
this lower-court judgement to stand unchallenged. And it is these cases 
which tend to be picked up by the media in their self-declared war upon 
the alleged rise of a ‘compensation culture’11.
Somehow, pointing out that:
(1) the ‘negative’ (i.e. liability imposing) cases tend to be in the lower 
courts (and therefore carry much less weight in law as ‘precedents’ to 
guide the evolution of the principles under which future cases will be 
determined); 
(2) that the more ‘positive’ judgements are in the senior courts (and 
therefore of higher precedent value); and
(3) that often the salaciously reported ‘negative’ cases are overruled if they 
are appealed up to the senior courts, 
9Mills-Davies –v– RSPB (2005) CLY 4196 – High Court
10Piccolo –v– Larkstock Ltd (trading as Chiltern Flowers) (2007) All ER (D) 251 (Jul) – High 
Court.
11See, for example, on the Piccolo case: “A killer petal fells a very big banker and it’s common 
sense that is the victim” Daily Mail, 20 July 2007.
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each fail to reassure land managers about the level of liability risk actually 
faced. This is perhaps not surprising – as there is never any guarantee 
that a claim that you receive might not end up being the exception to any 
‘general trend’ that a practising or academic lawyer might try to persuade 
you exists in safety law. Those who have faced the internal (or external) 
investigations imposed following a serious tree accident know it as a 
major emotional shockwave to both the individual staff involved, and to an 
organisation’s health and safety culture. A ‘threat’ of potential civil claim or 
criminal prosecution can hang over an organisation for years, for example 
the Health and Safety Executive deliberated for four years before finally 
deciding not to prosecute the National Trust following the fatal crushing of 
a child by a falling tree at its Dunham Massey Park in Cheshire in 200512. 
In a similar vein, eden (2007) writing as an arborculturalist in defence of 
the then proposed British Standard on tree safety (BS 8516) (BSI, 2008), 
chillingly recalls his own personal experience of having his tree surveying 
abilities forensically investigated following a fatal accident. He interprets 
his experience as “a salutary lesson” that persuaded him of the need for 
a benchmark, a reference standard, to be devised against which individual 
tree inspectors’ competence could be validated. Elsewhere eden (2008) 
expresses concern that in the absence of clear inspection standards is causing 
a polarisation between landowners who do too much and landowners who 
do too little to manage the safety of their trees.
So, given these anxieties, and even if a feared claim might well 
ultimately be unsuccessful if taken (expensively) all the way through the 
appeal courts, one can perhaps start to see how a pragmatic view might 
emerge within a beleaguered land manager (or his organisation) that it 
might make more sense to chop a tree down as a precaution and thereby 
avoid the time and expense of a court case to prove that the tree was 
safe (and/or that the previous safety management regime was adequate). 
Clearly, this way of thinking ultimately leads to the equivalent of defensive 
medicine, a “defensive arboriculture”13 (fay, 2007: 145) which pre-empts 
claims by the precautionary destruction of trees. In this regard, the 30,000 
street trees removed by the 33 London Boroughs between 2002 and 2007 
for “health and safety reasons” may be testimony to such a defensiveness 
(GLA, 2007).
12See “National Trust not prosecuted over boy killed by falling tree” The Daily Telegraph 17 
February 2009
13fay, applying the expression to arboricultural practice, defines the expression as “practice 
based on the anxiety of being found professionally wanting”
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Tree safety inspection standards
In 2006 the Poll case14, one involving a compensation claim from a 
motorcyclist injured when he collided with a fallen rotten tree, caused 
a wave of anxiety amongst tree owners, as it appeared to rule that tree 
inspections could only be carried out by professional arboriculturalists. 
This impression simplified (and generalised) the actual findings of the poll 
case, but the effect appears to have been to trigger a wave of concern 
about heightened liability for tree related accidents in the aftermath of that 
judgment. 
adams (2007), haythornthwaite (in rrac, 2008) and ball (2002) each 
argue that there are ‘risk entrepreneurs’ operating within sectors of the 
economy who (wittingly or unwittingly) amplify liability anxieties, and 
Haythornthwaite has specifically directed this allegation in the direction of 
those who advocated development of a specific British Standard for tree 
safety inspections in the aftermath of Poll, commenting thus:
“The draft Standard has been put together by a rather narrow group of 
arboriculturalists and tree surgeons who stand to gain from its adoption, 
while the potentially enormous costs would have to be met by tree 
owners.” (derbyshire, 2008)
haythornthwaite, whilst speaking as a UK Government risk adviser 
at the National Tree Safety Group’s May 2008 conference called to 
galvanise opposition to the draft British Standard, also specifically called 
for identification of actions needed to “reduce the influence of [risk] 
entrepreneurs” within the tree safety debate (haythornthwaite, 2008).
It is easy to allege (and less easy to prove) that all professional advisers 
are cynically overstating what the law (and reasonable practice) actually 
require – however it would appear hard to argue against a view that themes 
of risk assessment, liability avoidance and a focus upon the dis-benefits of 
risk dominate land management discourse. In this precautionary climate, as 
adams notes: “the job of the institutional risk manager is to try to imagine 
what might go wrong, and devise the means to avoid it” (2007: 100), for 
in the contemporary “risk-blame-litigation-compensation” culture (adams, 
2007: 99) accidents happen because of culpable negligence, they no longer 
apparently happen ‘by accident’: if by that we mean as a consequence of 
‘bad luck’ or ‘an act of god’. 
14Poll –v– Viscount Asquith of Morley (2006) EWHC 2251 (QB) which also echoes the 
approach of a similar junior court judgement in Chapman –v– Barking and Dagenham London 
Borough Council (1997) 2 EGLR 141 which advocated regular proactive systematic expert 
inspection of trees close to highways.
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It is understandable how the judgment in Poll could be perceived as a 
cause for concern that absence of documented safety inspection standards 
could leave tree owners exposed to the vagaries of the courts’ best ‘guesses’ 
as to what was (and was not) reasonable safety provision. Indeed Ball 
(2007b: 123) has advocated the importance of the formation of ‘sector 
groups’ to gather evidence on the actual level of risk and to decide what 
a balanced approach to safety management in their arena should look 
like. Such initiatives have worked well in other related sectors, such as 
the Play Safety Forum15 and the Visitor Safety in the Countryside Group16 
and myriad business and trade sector campaigns aimed at influencing how 
the generic requirements of law should be interpreted and applied in a 
‘workable’ (and proportionate) manner in their area. 
What appears key however, is that such initiatives need to be led by 
the duty holders, the persons upon whom the legal responsibility, and the 
attendant risk management and/or liability costs fall. The emergence of 
the National Tree Safety Group17, in opposition to the proposed British 
Standard on tree safety inspections appears a classic clash between adviser 
(i.e. arboriculturalist) advocates of that standardisation and the duty holders 
who feared the so-called ‘ratchet effect’ (ball, 1995; fay, 2008): that expert 
/ adviser based standard setting seems invariably to set safety requirements 
ever tighter. 
No doubt many arboriculturalists (like eden, 2007) would respond that 
they also face liability if they fail to adequately manage tree safety and 
that they have the most experience and knowledge to lead an expert review 
and standard setting process, and that process should aim to embody their 
communal view of what represents a sensible level of tree safety. However 
(as the experience of recent years has shown) standard setting cannot be 
left to experts, for the decision about what is reasonable is not a technical 
judgment – it does not simply equate to ‘what is possible?’18. Workable 
standards do not emerge automatically through distillation of current best 
practice, standard setting requires wider considerations of affordability, 
respect to the benefits of tolerating some risk of accidental death from tree 
failure and the vagaries of the risk of liability, given the paucity of case law 
and the prevailing attitudes of senior judges and policy makers. 




18See Lord Asquith’s influential interpretation of ‘reasonably practicable’ in Edwards –v–
National Coal Board (1949)1 All E.R. 743.
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Analysing the Poll judgement
It is instructive to note that in Poll the way in which the case was presented 
actually led to the court only having a narrow range of issues to adjudicate 
on, for the only evidence put before the judge was the expert testimony 
of the claimant’s and the defendant’s arboricultural experts. From the case 
report it appears that those experts had already agreed, out of court, that 
in their opinion a reasonable standard of safety provision for the tree in 
question would have been periodic inspection by a professionally competent 
person. Accordingly the judge was not asked to rule on this as a matter of 
law. The only questions for the judge (and he was required to determine 
these questions in the context of the particular accident and location – this 
was a junior court, not a senior court ruling aimed at creating a generic 
legal precedent) was whether (i) the person who had inspected the tree was 
sufficiently qualified to do so and (ii) whether inspection by a sufficiently 
competent person would have spotted the defect that subsequently led to the 
tree falling and blocking the road. On the first question the judge followed 
the views of the two expert witnesses and on the second issue the judge 
decided that a “Level 2” inspection would have involved a particularly 
intensive search for the fungal bracket which the judge surmised (given 
that there was no evidence available of how visible that feature would have 
been prior to the accident) was:
“probably…very well concealed…[but] a level two inspector would 
have been looking for that very thing[i]. He would have appreciated 
that decay could lie beneath this overhang. The very purpose of the 
examination was to eliminate this very hazard. It would have been 
imperative to feel carefully into the space – to scrape and discover 
[ii]. The size of the gap is not known. Was the overhang clear of the 
underlying ground by a few inches? Or was the bracket absolutely 
trapped, filling the gap completely? We will never know[iii]. That is 
because a competent inspection was never made. It ill behoves the 
Defendants, in these circumstances, to ask me to make assumptions 
which are unfavourable to the Claimant. I am quite satisfied, on a 
substantial balance of probabilities, that the fungal bracket would 
have been found[iv] ”19 (numbers added).
We can draw out some important observations from this passage, which 
was the concluding paragraph of the judge’s judgement (each of the 
19Paragraph 26 (the concluding paragraph) of the Judge MacDuff’s judgement in the Poll 
–v– Viscount Asquith of Morley (2006) EWHC 2251 case in the High Court (Queen’s Bench 
Division) – heard at Bristol District Registry on 11 May 2006.
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following numbered points references the relevant number added to the text 
above):
[i] As Lonsdale (2007: 170) notes, the judge’s optimism about whether 
competent Level 2 inspectors would have found the fungal bracket may 
not be not shared by all competent and conscientious inspectors; 
[ii] Does Level 2 actually require such vigour? Is it practicable? It is not 
even clear that the respective expert witnesses (upon whose testimony 
the judge was claiming to base his ruling) advocated as an imperative 
such ‘feeling’ and ‘scraping’;
[iii] Even the judge conceded that much (including the crucial question: 
whether the fungal bracket would have been discoverable before the 
accident) was left in the realm of supposition – but the judge had 
to decide the case in one or other parties’ favour. As Uff has noted 
(contrasting the difference between law and engineering): 
“the law must always find an answer to a dispute. No matter how 
complex the facts of the case, or how uncertain or novel the law” 
(2009: 4). 
In short: there has to be ‘closure’, even if that requires a decision to 
be made in equivocal circumstances, the case has to be decided in 
favour of one party or another – there is no scope for a ‘draw’. 
[iv] Thus the judge in the Poll case cannot stop there, acknowledge 
the impossibility of finding out what really happened and leave the 
matter open20 on a “we will never know” basis. Therefore, in a deft 
rhetorical manoeuvre he asserts that the defendant must be at fault 
because (extending his wording in order to expose the stretched logic) 
– if the defendant had properly inspected he would have found out 
whether the fungal bracket was discoverable or not. This appears to 
overstep the line between what is reasonable inspection and what is 
physically possible inspection (it passes beyond proportionality – or 
practicability – as the law terms that mitigating factor). The judge then 
(through further rhetorical flourish) bolsters his position by attacking 
the temerity of the Defence to suggest that the benefit of the doubt 
should lie with them, and does this by declaring that he is satisfied 
‘on the balance of probabilities’ that the fungal bracket would have 
been detected by a competent Level 2 inspection. 
20The only exception would be a Coroner’s Court, which on enquiring into a fatality could, for 
its own inquisitional purposes, rule (via an “Open” verdict) that the cause and circumstances 
of a death were unascertainable.
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These closing sentences reveal the judges aim: to reach a conclusion that 
will enable the claimant’s compensation claim to be sustained. In short, the 
judge, faced with an absence of evidence, a situation that would point in 
other circumstances towards a decision that “it’s impossible to say”, has to 
rule one way or the other and thus decides ‘on balance’ to do so in a way 
that will not prevent the claimant’s claim from proceeding any further. 
Analysis of this paragraph unmasks the imperative, present in every 
court case (whether civil or criminal) that a decision (and an allocation 
of culpability) has to be made – there is no scope for an ‘open verdict’. 
In this we can see a gap between legal theory and practice: for whilst, in 
concept the law assumes that its role is to regulate behaviour, and to uphold 
individual rights by expressing blame and censure, in practice, as crane 
(2006) and furedi (1999) both note, the functional primacy of negligence 
as a method of allocating responsibility (i.e. blame) has long since given 
way to the operation of negligence as a system of compensation, in which 
allocation of personal responsibility and “blame” is very much a secondary, 
and subordinated, factor. As harris et al. (1984, p. 18) note from their 
empirical study of personal injury claims:
“… the basic philosophy of the judge-made law on the tort of 
negligence is individualistic: the law seeks a justification for compelling 
one individual (the casual agent) to pay compensation to another 
individual (the victim) and finds it in the concept of negligence.”
Viewed in this way, the focus of claiming and case handling by the junior 
courts can be seen as a “means to an ends” (a contrivance) – the finer 
points of what the law says are actually secondary to a more instrumental 
question: namely, viewed in the round “is this claimant deserving of 
compensation?” (rather than “is this defendant at fault?”). In this way 
accident litigation has become depersonalised – it is a means to an end; 
and in the end it will be the insurer who pays (most) of a successful claim, 
not the party found to have been “at fault”. The junior judge in the poll 
case was acting pragmatically in a situation of limited information, his 
job was to rule upon the specific site, circumstances and parties before 
him. This was not an appeal court addressing its mind to the public policy 
implications of any ‘general rules’ that the judicial reasoning on display in 
the case report might, as binding precedent, cause to reverberate amongst 
tree owners across the nation.
Thus, for the various reasons now stated, Poll cannot be taken at face 
value as authoritatively setting a generic requirement for ‘Level 2’ inspections 
(however these may be defined – and the Poll judgement sheds little light 
on this) and we can apply ellison’s generic observation specifically to the 
circumstances of Poll: 
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“Tree managers and assessors should not be fearful of legal precedents 
that can be shown to have resulted from limited or defective expert 
evidence…judges are experts in law, but on all other matters they rely 
upon the evidence before them.” (2007: 141)
It will be clear from the analysis set out above that this paper’s author does 
not share forbes-laird’s (2009) certitude about poll being “an exemplar 
on the question of inspector competence”. forbes-laird’s analysis of the 
case law on tree inspection liability (and there are only a handful of 
reported cases over the last 100 years) concludes that Poll can be taken as 
indicative of a clear and stable pointer towards inspection based regimes 
being required by the courts for all but remote trees. For forbes-laird Poll 
is important because it (in his view) puts the need for professional tree 
inspection beyond doubt, leaving then only the question of what level and 
frequency of safety inspection would be reasonable. forbes-laird appears 
to support the development of a British Standard on tree safety inspection 
because that will then help show (or tell?) the courts what is a reasonable 
level of inspection. Opponents of standard setting can argue that in fact the 
judgement in Poll doesn’t resolve anything. There is nothing in Poll that 
would prevent a court in a future occasion taking a different view even if 
presented with similar facts.
Indeed in August 2008, in another junior court decision (Atkins –v– 
Scott21) also involving injury caused by tree failure due to disease, the judge 
in that case carefully reviewed the factual and expert evidence presented 
to him about the defendant landowner’s (undocumented) tree inspection 
regime and the non-specialist nature of the arboricultural training of the 
staff responsible for carrying out tree inspection on the estate in question 
and concluded that the arrangements, and the skill of the staff, were 
adequate, and that (in his view) whilst a more systematic and document 
based inspection regime would have been advantageous:
“…it is important not to become lost in procedures and ease of proof. 
What is important is whether or not the [landowner] discharged his 
duty to take such steps to protect passers-by on the highway from 
danger as a reasonable man in [his] position would have taken” (para 
66)
And, on the evidence, the landowner’s system in this case was found to 
be:
21Atkins –v– Scott (2008) Unreported, Aldershot and Farnham County Court, 14 August 2008 
(a transcript of the judgement delivered by Ian Hughes QC sitting as judge is available at: 
www.qtra.co.uk, last accessed 13 April 2010).)
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“an unrecorded but well-understood and adequate system for obtaining 
specialist assistance in respect of any trees thought to present 
problems.” (para 72)
The judge then went on to criticise the claimant’s expert witness for 
having overstated what should be regarded as a reasonable safety regime 
and expressed preference for the HSE’s published guidance over attempts to 
invoke (as was the case in Poll) an emphasis on paper qualifications (and 
specifically the concept of “Level 1 and Level 2” competence), stating:
“I did not find such rigid system of classification to be of assistance. 
It has no basis in official advice or widespread practice and there is 
a risk it will become prescriptive simply by repeated use by experts 
in first-instance cases”. (Para 75).
Here the Judge in Atkins is much closer to contemporary dispositions of 
the senior (appeal court) judiciary. He is mindful of the dangers of what 
ball (1995) and fay (2008) have termed the ‘ratchet effect’: that standards 
inexorably tighten through the ability of experts to always be able to find 
an example of ‘better’ practice to point to or to create a ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy’ through claiming in expert testimony that a particular level of 
conduct is reasonable.
The judge in Atkins then closes (ruling in favour of the defendant 
landowner) by expressing his sympathy for the claimant, noting that he 
was injured through no fault of his own, but adds the following robust 
declaration:
“…I cannot allow that sympathy to affect my judgement in this case. 
Falling trees kill or injure a very small number of people each year. 
So do lightning strikes. So does flash flooding. [The claimant] was 
involved in an accident. That is all. No one was to blame.” (Para 
101)
Such a view, and its resurrection of the notion of ‘blameless’ accident, 
echoes the robust judicial language of Tomlinson, Stovin, and section 1 
of the Compensation Act 2006. The judge’s pronouncements in Atkins tell 
us more about how a senior court would be likely to rule on tree safety 
standards than Poll, given that the views expressed in Atkins are more 
closely aligned to contemporary dispositions of the senior judiciary, the hse 
and risk policy commentators. The senior judiciary (as argued above) is 
now very sensitive about appearing to advocate a nil-risk world and this 
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stance chimes with developments in regulatory and political circles22. A 
future case that sought to follow Poll would have to reconcile its view 
with the clear message coming from the Health and Safety Executive and 
others advocating the need for the management of the tree safety risk to 
be proportionate. For, in the aftermath of Poll (and as the judge in Atkins 
noted), the Health and Safety Executive published guidance (hse, 2007a) for 
its inspectors re-affirming the suitability of non-specialist based inspection 
for the majority of trees. As the HSE’s Chief Executive later summarised 
(rrac, 2008):
“In 2007 HSE became concerned that uncertainty was causing some 
organisations to over-react to the low risk from falling trees. HSE 
therefore produced guidance for its inspectors on what is required 
by the law we enforce – the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
It makes the point that the risk is generally extremely low. For most 
trees around the countryside hse does not believe any action at all is 
reasonably practicable under the 1974 Act. Where trees are in very 
public places we suggest that non-specialist staff with a working 
knowledge of trees should look out for obvious problems as part 
of their everyday work. Inspection by tree experts is likely to be 
appropriate only in very limited circumstances, for example where 
a tree in a very public area is known to be unstable but is kept for 
heritage or other reasons. There are several other relevant pieces of 
non-hse law; we have encouraged stakeholders to agree a simple and 
proportionate approach to cover all the legal duties. We hope that by 
sharing our own guidance we have provided a useful starting point.”
Furthermore a statement was issued by the Royal Society for the Prevention 
of Accidents giving less than effusive support to the level of inspection 
advocated by the draft British Standard:
“It makes sense to have standards for looking after trees, but the idea 
of stipulating that you must get a tree inspected on a three year cycle 
is probably over the top, especially for organisations like the National 
Trust or the Forestry Commission.” (quoted in derbyshire, 2008)
In early 2008 the development of a draft British Standard came under scrutiny 
from the National Tree Safety Group (NTSG) and the Government’s Risk and 
Regulation Advisory Council (RRAC). The RRAC’s Chairman, led the charge 
22See for example then Prime Minister, tony blair’s speech ‘Common sense culture not 
compensation culture’ to the Institute for Public Policy Research on 26 May 2005: http://www.
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against the proposed standard (and the perceived ‘professionalisation’ of 
tree safety inspection that the British Standard’s critics felt that it entailed), 
declaring that:
“The risk from trees has not increased. The RRAC believes the 
existing legal principle, effective for the last 60 years, is sufficient. 
If the industry insists on pressing forward a new standard, then 
the cost-benefit analysis needs to be better thought through, and 
the public’s voice must be heard…I am deeply concerned by the 
proposed introduction of what could be a disproportionate, costly and 
unnecessarily bureaucratic system for managing trees.” (rrac, 2008)
Due to the intervention of the NTSG and RRAC, development of the draft 
British Standard is currently suspended, pending the publication later this 
year of guidance being developed by the NTSG  and its funded research 
into the level of risk actually posed by falling trees in public spaces in the 
UK – an annual risk believed to be one fatality per 10 Million people (hse, 
2007a: 2).
The role of liability risk perception in ‘creating’ the law
We have seen above the interplay between:
• selective media reporting of ‘compensation culture’ type cases;
• the prominence given in the courts to expert safety professional testimony 
on ‘reasonable practice’; and 
• landowners’ and Governmental concerns upon affordability, manageability 
and proportionality of safety standards.
This starts to show us how determining what the law requires as ‘reasonable’ 
safety is not the sole province of the courts, it is the result of a multi-
agency interaction, whereby through a process of evolution – one involving 
competition between rival views of what is reasonable/practicable – the law 
acquires its sense of what is the required level of safety provision. 
The tree safety debate is currently within that gestation phase, and 
the final outcome on what is ‘reasonable’ safety provision remains to be 
seen. However, tree safety is not the only area in which this process of 
‘safety-level’ setting has been playing itself out recently. One can identify 
similar tensions at play in the evolution of concerns about reasonable safety 
23
23The NTSG’s draft guidance (NTSG 2010) was issued for consultation on 21 May 2010.
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provision for memorial24 safety in municipal cemeteries. The evolutionary 
path of that safety issue may shed some light on how the tree safety debate 
will evolve, particularly given the multitude of existing guidance on tree 
safety25.
Following the fatal crushing of a child in a cemetery in Harrogate in 
2000, enforcement action by the HSE against Harrogate Council led to 
widespread remedial action by Burial Authorities across the UK. Many 
thousands of gravestones were either laid flat, removed entirely or staked 
as a precaution against them falling over. However, almost immediately, 
there was outcry from the press and families of the deceased at this 
perceived desecration. In this changed climate the Government and the 
HSE sought to distance themselves from ‘the great laying down’. Even 
the Local Government Ombudsman became involved (lgo, 2006). These 
agencies emphasised that the risk of ‘toppling tombstones’ was low and 
that remedial steps should not be undertaken as a matter of course (and 
then only with great sensitivity). Burial Authorities were told to draw 
upon industry best practice in the absence of any central standards. Safety 
consultants (often memorial masons) expanded their range of services to 
include “topple testing” based around a handheld pressure test gauge (an 
interesting parallel with the cautionary views of lonsdale (2007) and fay 
(2007) on the increasing dependency on device-based methods for tree safety 
testing and the consequent downgrading of the role of expert judgment). 
Meanwhile, in this vacuum various professional bodies developed their own 
standards (standards which were set fairly conservatively, with the aim of 
protecting their professional membership from perceived liability). By the 
time that official Governmental advice became available in January 2009 
(moj, 2009) these professional standards were quite well embedded and 
the Governmental guidance was met with suspicion by the members of 
these organisations. The fear of liability, and defensive land management 
endorsed by the professional associations, appeared to create a resistance 
to the new guidance, and individual cemetery managers felt themselves in 
a no-win situation and doubting that centralised guidance could actually 
protect them against the inherent vagueness of the criminal and civil law 
expectation of ‘reasonable safety’, in the words of one manager interviewed 
in bennett and gibbeson’s (2010) study:
“we’ve got to recognise, irrespective of whether the hse are now 
saying you know ‘there’s a fair degree of risk that’s tolerable’ the 
reality is it doesn’t materialise like that and I certainly won’t accept 
that until I see evidence of that through the courts.”
24In this sense memorial means headstones, statues and other stone and iron grave architecture 
prone to risk of collapse onto persons visiting graveyards.
25For example, doe 1973 & 1975, lonsdale 1999, davis et al. 2000.
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This case study shows us that the Government and regulators (and even the 
senior courts) cannot directly control how liability (and what is necessary 
in order to achieve ‘reasonable safety’) is perceived by those who feel that 
the law does expose them to risk of liability. To assume that promulgation 
of ‘official’ guidance, standards or interpretation will easily ‘correct’ how 
liability is perceived by a particular ‘interpretive community’ is to apply a 
linear model of communication that has been seriously questioned in the 
last 40 years, by communication and risk perception theorists who 
emphasise the need to take account of the way in which the audience will 
interpret (and/or ignore) the message, based upon their own preconceptions 
of what they already think is relevant and/or correct (fiske, 1990; lupton, 
1999).
What’s in the mind of the individual manager?
In situations involving debate about safety standard setting (specifically the 
benchmarking of what is (as the law requires) “reasonable” in relation to 
tree safety management) a contest of rival organisational views of what is 
reasonable, may well eventually produce a more stable consensus about 
what is reasonable safety provision. However, even where stable, widely 
held interpretations of what the law requires exist, it’s unlikely that the 
perception of the risk of liability at ‘front line’ level can ever be fully 
managed. Our research into individual interpretations of safety law (bennett 
and crowe, 2008) suggest that, at local, on-the-ground level, the interpretation 
and application of safety law can be very ad hoc and approximate indeed. 
In even our study of safety liability perception within 21 major pro-access 
countryside organisations we found evidence that much of the subtleties of 
court judgments and legislation pass unnoticed by lay managers. Safety law, 
in realty, operates in a much more ‘approximate’ manner, informed by local 
practices, organisational expectations and experiences with claimants (and 
on occasion stirred by media reports a new case in the lower courts that has 
seen liability imposed upon a landowner as (to the reader) further evidence 
of the growth of a ‘compensation culture’ and/or a ‘nanny state’). There is 
also some evidence to suggest that safety/risk management may often be 
used as a more acceptable justification for other less socially acceptable 
urges: fear of crime, trespass or a simple desire to preserve privacy (see 
Forestry Commission, 2005). In that regard it is notable that there is very 
little detail in the Greater London Authority’s ‘Chainsaw Massacre’ report 
(gla, 2007) to prove how many of the 30,000 trees reported as chopped 
down for ‘health & safety’ reasons were diseased or otherwise posing an 
actual safety hazard. It may be that ‘health and safety’ operates as a broad, 
morally and politically acceptable designation for getting rid of trees for 
other reasons. 
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However, on the ‘plus’ side, our studies have also suggested that 
interventions billed by the media as examples of risk aversion gone mad 
often have a far more prosaic and defensible basis when the matter is 
investigated in greater detail. The dangers of reliance upon press reports as 
evidence of anxiety about the tightening of the liability noose is illustrated 
by the example of press reports in 2006 of Torbay Council’s risk adverse 
stance on the planting of its signature “palm trees”. The story (which was 
picked up by various of the national papers, including the Daily Telegraph26 
from which the quote below are taken) had it that the Council’s senior 
landscape officer had blocked the planting of these trees in pedestrian areas 
because:
“as they have very sharp leaves, [they] need to be carefully sited 
in streetscapes, where they could cause injury to eyes/faces if 
inappropriately placed.” 
In the local political spat that ensued, commentators lampooned their 
official’s stance, either intentionally:
“Torbay Council’s elected mayor, said he did not think that there was 
any risk from palm trees unless 'you were in the Caribbean and a 
great big pineapple fell on your head'.” 
or unintentionally ridiculed their official whilst trying to support him – by 
attempting to explain that such trees could be dangerous, a local Councillor 
drew an unfortunately colourful metaphor:
“Its a bit like keeping tigers: they are beautiful to look at but you 
wouldn’t want them wandering the streets.” 
These sound bites reinforced the view of this story as an instance of the 
“nanny state” gone mad. However buried away within the story were hints 
that the article was less clear cut than this. But, only a careful reading 
would spot these more prosaic aspects. It is not that the press reports were 
inaccurate – but rather that it is the most salacious elements that stick in the 
mind of the reader. As part of our 2008 study we traced and interviewed, 
the Landscape Officer involved. He was able to explain that the story had 
its origins in a very specific local planting decision. His aversion to planting 
the palms, was part of a rational risk assessment. It was not inspired by a 
fear of litigation or a risk-averse culture within that Council. The decision 
related to the request for these palms to be planted at one specific shopping 
26
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precinct location – one where there would have been a real risk of eye level 
contact between members of the public and sharp fronds. As the article 
mentioned (but only subtly, and in passing) the Council had not stopped 
planting these trees at all locations, there was no general issue of policy 
imposed here. In the officer’s view the national press had picked up on this 
story from the local press (where the clash of stakeholder views was of 
consequence) because of its colourful quotes, and had portrayed it within a 
new, wider context, that of a “nanny state” discourse.
In a similar vein, another national press story, concerning Swansea City 
Council, appears to say it all in its title:
“150 year old Monkey puzzle tree facing chop because council says 
its needles are ‘like syringes’”27.
Once again the use of unfortunately colourful metaphor by a Council 
spokesman gives ready opportunity for ridicule of the Council’s decision, 
probably betraying an underlying rationality / complexity that – if unearthed 
by the journalist – would spoil the neat extremity of the story. 
Our ongoing research seeks to empirically test the views of those 
commentators who view society as rapidly falling into a deep pit of risk 
aversion, thus Landry:
“The evaluation of everything from a perspective of risk is a defining 
characteristic of contemporary society. Risk is the managerial 
paradigm and default mechanism that has embedded itself into how 
companies, community organisations and the public sector operate. 
Risk is a prism through which any activity is judged … It narrows 
our world into a defensive shell.” (2005: 3)
Whilst this author shares some of Landry’s concerns, the evidence 
of defensive land (and/or tree) management is actually harder to find 
when you start looking for it. We can indeed find signs of greater risk 
assessment, thus greater levels of slips and trips recording as a defensive 
response to perceived ‘compensation culture’ (for example HSE, 2007b) – 
but at individual level risk aversion borne of heightened liability perception 
becomes harder to spot, as at individual level perceptions and actions are 
likely to have been more sublimated, more naturalised and rationalised. At 




“150 year old Monkey puzzle tree facing chop because council says its needles are ‘like 
syringes’ ” Daily Mail, 24 May 2008
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The circulation of cases and interpretations
In researching this paper it has been apparent that within the arboricultural 
sector web postings by individual practitioners on their own websites and/
or forums such as the Arboricultural Information Exchange (AIE)28 can 
draw attention to junior court cases that might otherwise not catch media 
or peer attention. In particular it is noteworthy that the expert reports and 
other court papers for Poll were available on the AIE site, but with less 
information accessible there on Atkins. It would appear (to the author as 
an outsider looking in) that in this relatively small professional community 
there is a relatively easy opportunity for an individual contributor to raise 
the profile of a particular case or point of law that he has been dealing with 
(or is troubled by). This may explain the way in which Poll came to be 
‘picked-up’ by the trade and mainstream media as a perceived step change 
in what the law required, with the consequent focus upon (and then reaction 
against) the move towards setting a British Standard. Clearly, it is common 
practice, in many professional sectors, to write articles, press releases or 
postings based around cases that one has been involved with (particularly 
if successful) or matters that one is concerned about. Therefore these 
observations are not intended to impose judgement upon these practices, 
they fall short of discovery of a ‘smoking gun’ of risk entrepreneurship, but 
these practices do show an interpretive community at work debating and 
evolving perceptions of ‘reasonable safety’ in tree management. 
In the aftermath of Poll arboricultural commentators appear to have 
progressively adjusted their position – there now seems resignation to a 
more pragmatic approach – this is perhaps best summed up by barrell 
(2009) writing in an article highlighting his involvement as successful 
expert witness in both Poll and Atkins:
“There are no simple answers to all these questions; a recipe based 
approach does not work and the final decisions are made from the 
subjective interpretation of all the evidence by the judge” (2); and
“It is human nature to seek formulaic solutions to important problems 
because that approach delivers consistent and reliable answers, with 
little need for subjective interpretation. This works well in disciplines 
such as accountancy and engineering where the inputs are mainly 
objective, but it cannot be so reliably applied to trees.” (4)
This candour is, in itself, notable – for an expert witness (particularly 
one in a relatively small specialist community) may well in his career 
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find himself acting in turn for claimants and defendants. BARRELL's erudite 
and credible article, and his embracing of a ‘subjective’ and case specific 
approach to determining reasonable safety, would appear necessary in 
order to reconcile his success as expert in advocating a systematic and 
qualification driven approach to tree inspection in Poll but successfully 
defending the effectiveness of a un-documented and non-expert based 
inspection system the following year in Atkins. Clearly, the court found the 
factual circumstances to be different in each case, but BARRELL’s document 
makes interesting reading – for it seeks to rationalise Poll within a trend 
justifying pragmatism. Perhaps in a small interpretive community such 
rapid evolution of ‘conventional’ views is to be expected.
Conclusion
This article set out to show that it is not just the courts who determine 
what level of safety inspection the law requires for trees. The significant 
role of arboricultural and tree owner view points (both “expert” and “lay”) 
has been shown and yet, perhaps, it is actually at the level of day-to-day 
actions of individuals, and their decisions upon whether or not to fell a 
tree as ‘unsafe’ that the law is made, and made through (and because of) 
liability perception. The fate of trees lies in the hands of these processes 
as much as in the hands of the judiciary, the would-be standards setters or 
the politicians. 
References
ADAMS, J. (2007) Dangerous trees. Arboricultural Journal, 30, 95–103.
BALL, D. (1995) In search of a balanced approach to visitor safety. 
Countryside Recreation Network News, 3(3), 4–6.
BALL, D. (2002) Playgrounds – risks, benefits and choices. HSE Contract 
Research Report 426/2002.
BALL, D. (2007a) Why risk assessment needs an underpinning philosophy. 
Arboricultural Journal, 30, 111–119.
BALL, D. (2007b) I’ll manage risk my way. Arboricultural Journal, 30, 
121–125.
BARRELL, J. (2009) Duty of care and trees; the emerging legal position. Barrell 
Tree Consultancy. (available at: http://www.rics.org/site/download_feed.
aspx?fileID=5867&fileExtension=PDF , last accessed 14 April 2010).
BENNETT, L. and CROWE, L. (2008) Landowners’ liability? Is perception of 
the risk of liability for visitor accidents a barrier to countryside access? 
Countryside Recreation Network: Sheffield. Available at: http://shura.shu.
ac.uk/678/ (last accessed 14 April 2010).
162 ARBORICULTURAL JOURNAL
BENNETT, L. (2009) Why, what, and how? A case study on law, risk, and 
decision making as necessary themes in built environment teaching. 
Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and 
Construction, 1(2), 105–113. Available at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/694/ 
(last accessed 2 February 2010).
BENNETT, L. and GIBBESON, C. (2010) Perceptions of occupiers’ liability 
risk by estate managers: a case study of memorial safety in English 
cemeteries. The International Journal of Law in the Built Environment, 
2(1), 77–93. Available at http://shura.shu.ac.uk/1737/ (last accessed 14 
June 2010).
BSI (BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION) (2008) Draft for public comment: BS 
8516 Recommendations for tree safety inspection. BSI: London. Available 
at: http://www.trees.org.uk/downloads/bs8516draft.pdf (last accessed 14 
April 2010).
CRANE, P. (2006) Atiyah’s accidents compensation & the law (7th ed.). 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
DAVIS, C., FAY, N. and MYNORS, C. (2000) Veteran trees: a guide to risk 
and responsibility. English Nature: Peterborough. Available at: http://
naturalengland.etraderstores.com/NaturalEnglandShop/IN131 (last 
accessed 31 March 2010).
DERBYSHIRE, D. (2008) Thousands of Britain’s trees could be felled by 
health & safety rules. Daily Mail, 20 June.
DOE (DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT) (1973) Circular: 90/73 – Inspection, 
maintenance and planting of roadside trees on rural roads. DOE: 
London.
DOE (DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT) (1975) Circular: 52/75 – Inspection 
of highway trees. DOE: London.
EDEN, N. (2007) Towards a national standard for tree risk inspections. 
Arboricultural Journal, 30, 127–136.
EDEN, N. (2008) Tree management – reviewing current range and purpose 
of standards. Tree Management for Public Safety – Towards An Industry 
Statement – A One Day Conference. National Tree Safety Group, London. 
Available at: http://www.treeworks.co.uk/blog/index.php/2008/06/08/the-
tree-safety-group-tree-management-for-public-safety/ (last accessed 14 
April 2010).
ELLISON, M. (2007) Moving the focus from tree defects to rational risk 
management – A paradigm shift for tree managers. Arboricultural 
Journal, 30, 137–142.
FAY, N. (2007) Towards reasonable tree risk decision-making? Arboricultural 
Journal, 30, 143–162.
FAY, N. (2008) An inclusive approach to non-defensive tree risk consensus. 
Tree Management for Public Safety – Towards An Industry Statement – 
A One Day Conference, National Tree Safety Group, London. Available 
	 TREES AND PUBLIC LIABILITY – WHO REALLY DECIDES WHAT IS REASONABLY SAFE? 163
at: http://www.treeworks.co.uk/blog/index.php/2008/06/08/the-tree-safety-
group-tree-management-for-public-safety/ (last accessed 14 April 2010).
FISH, S. (1980) Is there a text in this class? The authority of interpretive 
communities. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
FISKE, J. (1990) Introduction to communication studies. Routledge: 
London.
FORBES-Laird, J. (2009) Liability for death or injury caused by falling 
trees or branches: A review of the present position under English law in 
relation to tree safety inspection. Arboricultural Journal, 32, 233–241.
FORESTRY COMMISSION (2005) Woodland owners’ attitudes to public access 
provision in south-east England – Information note. Edinburgh: Forestry 
Commission. Available at: http://www.forestresearch.gov.uk/pdf/fcin074.
pdf/$FILE/fcin074.pdf (last accessed 31 March 2010).
FUREDI, F. (1999) Courting mistrust – the hidden growth of a culture of 
litigation in Britain. Centre for Policy Studies: London.
GLA (GREATER LONDON AUTHORITY) (2007) Chainsaw massacre – a review 
of London’s street trees. GLA: London. Available at: http://legacy.
london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/environment/chainsaw-massacre.pdf (last 
accessed 31 March 2010).
HARRIS, D., MACLEAN, M., GENN, H., LLOYD-BOSTOCK, S., FENN, P., CORFIELD, 
P. and BRITTAN, Y. (1984) Compensation and support of illness and 
injury. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
HAYTHORNTHWAITE, R. (2008) A government perspective – current thinking 
about risk regulation. Tree Management for Public Safety – Towards 
An Industry Statement – A One Day Conference, National Tree Safety 
Group, London. Available at: http://www.treeworks.co.uk/blog/index.
php/2008/06/08/the-tree-safety-group-tree-management-for-public-safety/ 
(last accessed 14 April 2010).
HSE (HEALTH and SAFETY EXECUTIVE) (2007a) HSE Sector Information 
Minute (SIM 01/2007/05) Management of risk from falling trees. HSE: 
London. Available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/sectors/ag_
food/1_07_05.pdf (last accessed 31 March 2010).
HSE (HEALTH and SAFETY EXECUTIVE) (2007b) Exploration of the affect 
of litigation culture on the attribution and reporting of slip and trip 
accidents. Research Report: RR552 April 2007 Health & Safety 
Laboratory: Buxton. Available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/
rr552.htm (last accessed 31 March 2010).
LANDRY, C. (2005) Risk and the creation of liveable cities. What are we 
scared of? The value of risk in designing public space. Commission for 
Architecture and the Built Environment: London. Available at: http://
www.cabe.org.uk/publications/what-arewe-scared-of (last accessed 31 
March 2010).
164 ARBORICULTURAL JOURNAL
LGO (LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN) (2006) Special report: memorial safety 
in local authority cemeteries. The Commission for Local Administration 
in England: London. Available at: http://www.lgo.org.uk/complaints-
about-safety-testing-cemeteries/ (last accessed 31 March 2010).
LONDSDALE, D. (1999) The principles of tree hazard assessment and 
management. DETR and Forestry Commission, Highways Agency: 
London.
LONSDALE, D. (2007) Current issues in arboricultural risk assessment and 
management. Arboricultural Journal, 30, 163–174.
LUPTON, D. (1999) Risk. Routledge: London.
MOJ (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE) (2009) Managing the safety of burial ground 
memorials. London: Ministry of Justice. Available, with related press 
releases at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/safety-burial-grounds.
htm (last accessed 31 March 2010).
MYNORS, C. (2002) The law of trees, forests and hedgerows. Sweet & 
Maxwell: London.
NTSG (NATIONAL TREE SAFETY GROUP) (2010) Bringing common sense to 
tree management – guidance on trees and public safety in the UK for 
owners, managers and advisers (Consultation document). Available at: 
http://www.forestry.gov.uk/website/forestry.nsf/byunique/infd-7t6bs5 (Last 
accessed 15 August 2010).
RRAC (RISK AND REGULATION ADVISORY COUNCIL), (2008) Look before you 
leap into new rules for trees (Press Release PN RRAC 0801). 20 June, 
Available at: http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file46699.pdf (last accessed 31 
March 2010).
STEAD, R. (2008) The tree owner’s duty of care and duty of inspection. 
Arboricultural Journal, 30, 289–295.
UFF, J. (2009) Construction law. Sweet & Maxwell: London.
WATT, J.M. (2007) The management of risk with respect to cultural heritage 
– a case study. Arboricultural Journal, 30, 175–185.
